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Abstract
This paper analyzes the e¤ects of human capital (HC) and physical capital (PC) for
the productivity of science departments. To address the endogeneity of input choices I
use two extensive but temporary shocks to the HC and PC of science departments. As
HC shock I use the dismissal of mostly Jewish scientists in Nazi Germany. As PC shock I
use the destruction of facilities by Allied bombings during WWII. In the short run, a 10
percent to HC lowered departmental productivity by about 0.21sd. A 10 percent shock
to PC lowered departmental productivity by about 0.05sd in the short run. While the
HC shock persisted until the end of my sample period (1980), departments experiencing
a PC shock recovered very quickly (by 1961). Additional results show that the dismissal
star scientistswas particularly detrimental, and that a fall in the quality of hires was an
important mechanism for the persistence of the HC shock.
1 Introduction
Which inputs lead to successful scientic research? As for the production of goods, basic inputs
for producing scientic knowledge are human and physical capital, i.e. scientists and their
laboratories (Machlup, 1961). Understanding the relative role of these inputs is important for
researchers, university administrators, and policy makers alike. At the moment, many countries
such Brazil, South Korea, and especially China, are investing heavily in their university system
(Kugler, 2011, Rhee, 2011, Wang et al. 2011). Should they hire outstanding scholars or
construct new laboratories to achieve the highest return on their investment? The answers to
these questions are particularly relevant in a world where ideas and scientic knowledge are
seen as key drivers of technological progress and economic growth (Romer, 1990).
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Despite the signicance of these issues we know little about the e¤ects of di¤erent inputs
for the production of scientic knowledge. As highlighted for rms by a large literature in
industrial economics, the estimation of production functions is complicated because inputs are
often chosen on the basis of unobservable productivity shocks (e.g. Ackerberg, et al. 2007).
Estimating knowledge production functionsis similarly challenging. Star scientistsmay be
attracted by more productive departments and at the same time enhance the departments
productivity. Similarly, high quality departments attract more funding for physical capital
which further increases productivity. Obtaining unbiased estimates for the e¤ects of human
and physical capital is further complicated because good scientists attract funding for additional
physical capital.
To overcome these di¢ culties I use two extensive, but temporary, shocks. As human capital
shock I use the dismissal of mostly Jewish scientists in Nazi Germany and Austria between 1933
and 1940. As physical capital shock I use the destruction of science facilities by Allied bombings
during WWII. The two shocks a¤ected science departments very di¤erently and therefore create
ample variation. The dismissal of scientists reduced the faculty by up to 60 percent in some
departments while others remained una¤ected. Similarly, Allied bombings completely destroyed
some departments while others were not a¤ected.
I investigate how the two shocks a¤ected department productivity in the short run, and
whether they persisted in the long run. To analyze these e¤ects I construct a new data set
of all scientists in German and Austrian physics, chemistry, and mathematics departments at
seven points in time between 1926 and 1980. The micro data contain more than 10,000 scientist-
year observations with detailed productivity measures in top journals for each scientist. I use
this data to construct productivity measures for all science departments between 1926 and
1980. I add data on the two shocks from detailed historical records of dismissals from German
and Austrian universities in Nazi Germany and from archival material on bombing destruction
during WWII.
Results show that both human and physical capital shocks had a negative e¤ect on scientic
output in the short run. A 10 percent shock to human capital lowered departmental productivity
by about 0.21 standard deviations. A 10 percent shock to physical capital lowered productivity
by about 0.05 of a standard deviation in the short run. As the two shocks only had a temporary
e¤ect on inputs, I can investigate their long-run e¤ects. The human capital shock persisted in
the long run and continued to have a negative impact on scientic output almost 50 years after
the dismissals (in 1980). The physical capital shock, however, did not persist. The productivity
of departments that had been bombed during WWII had recovered by 1961. By 1970, bombed
departments even had slightly higher productivity than other departments; this suggests that
bombed departments benetted from upgrading during post-war reconstruction (these results
are only signicant in some specications).
I show that the results are not driven by other changes that a¤ected the German and
Austrian university system which may have been correlated with the two shocks. In particular,
the results are robust to controlling for post-war occupations zones (U.S., U.K., French, or
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Soviet zones) and dropping East German and Austrian universities from the sample. The
results are also robust to controlling for the creation of federal states after WWII. Similarly,
controlling for changes at the university level, such as changes in university age and increased
competition from newly founded universities does not a¤ect the results. I also show evidence
that changes at the city level are not driving my ndings; the results are robust to controlling
for bombing destruction at the city level, changes in the overall fraction of Jews in a city,
investment in armament related industries by the Nazi government, and the erection of the
iron curtain.
Recent work has highlighted the contribution of star scientists to the advancement of
scientic knowledge (Azoulay, Zivin, and Wang, 2010). Many of the dismissed scholars were
among the leaders of their profession; the dismissed include 11 Nobel Laureates such as the
physicists Albert Einstein, Max Born, and Erwin Schrödinger and the chemists Fritz Haber and
OttoMeyerhof. I can therefore investigate whether losing high quality scientists had particularly
large e¤ects on departmental productivity. I nd that the dismissal of high quality scientists
was associated with a larger productivity decline. Losing star scientists was particularly
detrimental. The loss of a scientist in the top 5th percentile of the quality distribution lowered
long-run productivity by between 0.7 and 1.6 standard deviations (compared to an e¤ect of 0.2
standard deviations for losing any scientist).
I then evaluate some possible mechanisms for the persistence of the human capital shock.
I show that a reduction in department size after the dismissals only explains some of the
productivity decline. A key mechanism for the persistence of the human capital shock was a
permanent fall in the quality of hires, in particular after the dismissal of high quality scientists.
As previous research has shown, localized productivity spillovers are unlikely to drive persistence
in this context (Waldinger, 2011).
To my knowledge, no previous paper has analyzed the role of human and physical capital
for the creation of scientic knowledge using exogenous variation in inputs. Existing empirical
evidence has shown that scientic productivity of university departments is correlated with
department size and research expenditure (Johnes, Taylor, and Francis, 1993). At the country
level, patenting is signicantly related to R&D manpower and spending (Furman, Porter, and
Stern, 2002).1
My ndings also relate to several papers investigating the persistence of large economic
shocks. Physical capital shocks, such as extensive bombings, usually dissipate relatively quickly
(Davis and Weinstein, 2002, Brackman, Garretsen, Schramm, 2004, Miguel and Roland, 2011).2
1A number of papers investigate other drivers of university productivity. University governance signicantly
a¤ects how changes in funding a¤ect research performance (Aghion et al., 2010). An increase of university
funding increases the number of published papers but not their quality (Payne and Siow, 2003, Whalley and
Hicks, 2011). At the level of individual scientists, National Institutes of Health (NIH) funding only has a
limited impact on the research of marginal grant recipients (Jacob and Lefgren, 2011). Howard Hughes Medical
Institute grants, however, which tolerate early failure and reward long-run success, increase the probability of
publishing high-impact papers (Azoulay, Gra¤ Zivin, and Manso, 2011).
2Other physical capital shocks, such as the massive infrastructure investment in the Tennessee valley between
the 1930s and 1950s only had limited long-run e¤ects that will likely disappear with time (Kline and Moretti,
2011).
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Most human capital shocks, however, seem to persist in the long run. The extinction of the
Jewish population in the Soviet Union by the German Army during WWII still a¤ects city
growth, per capita income, wages, and political outcomes today (Acemoglu, Hassan, Robinson,
2011) and reduces entrepreneurship and support for markets and democracy (Grosfeld, Rod-
nyansky, and Zhuravskaya, 2011). In Germany, the decline of the Jewish population during the
Nazi era had persistent negative e¤ects on education levels (Akbulut-Yuksel and Yuksel, 2011).
In the present paper I analyze the persistence of human and physical capital shocks within the
same framework for the rst time. My results corroborate the ndings of earlier papers that
have separately analyzed human and physical capital shocks.
This paper also improves our understanding of Germanys decline as scientic superpower
after WWII. At the beginning of the 20th century, German scientists were at the pinnacle of
their profession (American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1941) and the leading
German universities, especially Göttingen and Berlin, attracted large numbers of foreign schol-
ars. Physicists like Arthur Compton (Nobel Prize, 1927) and Robert Oppenheimer from the
United States, Leo Szilard and Eugene Wigner (Nobel Prize, 1961) from Hungary, Enrico Fermi
(Nobel Prize, 1938) from Italy, and many Germans such as Werner Heisenberg (Nobel Prize,
1932), Max Born (Nobel Prize, 1954), and James Frank (Nobel Prize, 1925) had permanent or
visiting positions in Göttingen during the 1920s (Dardo, 2004, p. 171).3 After WWII, German
science declined massively and the United States became the dominant scientic force. This
development is reected in data on Nobel Prizes as shown in appendix Figure A1. Germanys
decline may have been caused by a number of factors. The dismissal of some of the most
prominent scientists (among them 11 Nobel laureates) and bombing destruction during WWII
are obvious factors that I consider in this paper.
My estimates indicate that the dismissal of scientists reduced total output in a¤ected Ger-
man and Austrian science departments by 9,576 top journal publications between 1933 and
1980; a reduction of about 33.5 percent. In terms of citations weighted publications, a¤ected
German science departments lost 191,920 (34.6 percent) citations due to the dismissal. Dis-
missed scientists themselves produced 1,181 top journal publications receiving 32,369 citations.
This shows that the e¤ect of the dismissals on German science was much larger than the direct
loss of publications and citations of dismissed scientists because the productivity loss in a¤ected
departments persisted at least until 1980.
WWII bombings of German science departments reduced total output of a¤ected depart-
ments by 1,028 top journal publications between 1944 and 1980; a fall of about 5.7 percent.
Citation weighted publications declined by 22,194 (6.4 percent).4 These calculations indicate
that the dismissal of scientists in Nazi Germany contributed about 9 times more to the decline
of German science than physical destruction during WWII.5
3Many of these illustrious scientists were later dismissed by the Nazi regime. Max Born and James Franck
were dismissed from their professorships in Göttingen in 1933. Leo Szilard and Eugene Wigner who had moved
to the University of Berlin and the Technical University of Berlin were also dismissed in 1933.
4The time periods for the calculation of percentage losses for dismissals and bombings are di¤erent because
dismissals a¤ected productivity from 1933 onwards, but bombings only a¤ected productivity after 1943.
5For subject level results and details on these calculations see appendix section 8.3.
4
2 Human and Physical Capital Shocks
The production of scientic knowledge uses human and physical capital as main inputs (Machlup,
1961):
Y = f(H,K)
where Y measures output such as publications or citations in top journals, H measures
human capital and K measures physical capital. University governance determines how human
and physical capital are combined to produce scientic knowledge. Recent research has shown
that more autonomous universities and those operating in a more competitive environment are
better at converting funding increases into research output (Aghion et al., 2009).
Estimating knowledge production functions is challenging because inputs are often chosen
on the basis of unobservable productivity shocks (Ackerberg et. al., 2007). Star scientistsmay
be attracted by highly productive departments and at the same time enhance the departments
productivity. Similarly, investment in physical capital usually occurs in more productive univer-
sities. Establishing causality is therefore challenging. An additional problem is the separation
of human and physical capital e¤ects because good scientists like to work in universities with
well equipped laboratories and attract funding for additional physical capital.
Even without these endogeneity concerns it would be challenging to directly estimate the
production function of universities because of the di¢ culty to obtain information on physical
capital of science departments over reasonably long time periods.6 I therefore use an indirect
way to identify the importance of human and physical capital by investigating the persistence
of large, and I argue exogenous, shocks to the human and physical capital of German and
Austrian science departments. I estimate the short-run impact and the long-run persistence of
these shocks as follows:
Outputdt = 1 +
P
t 2tHCShock(1933-40)d * Yeart +
P
t 3t PCShock(1942-45)d * Yeart (1)
+ 4 DepartmentFEd + 5YearFEt + "dt
Where Output is a measure of a department ds research output in year t, such as total
publications or citation weighted publications. HCShock(1933-40) measures the temporary
shock to human capital during the dismissal of mainly Jewish scientists between 1933 and 1940.
PCShock(1942-45) measures the temporary shock to physical capital during Allied bombings
that occurred between 1942 and 1945. I describe both shocks in more detail below. The
interactions of the shocks with year dummies (one for each of the 7 years between 1926 and
1980 for which I observe department productivity)7 allow me to investigate the persistence of
the two shocks.8
6In fact, I have unsuccessfully tried to obtain consistent measures of physical capital for German and Austrian
science departments for this paper.
7One of the 7 interactions will be the excluded category for each shock.
8Some science professors may have been killed by Allied bombings and thus bombings may have had a direct
impact on human capital. In my data there is no evidence that the number of scientists who disappear from the
sample between 1940 and 1950 is correlated with bombing destruction at the department level. In a regression
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2.1 Human Capital Shock: The Dismissal of Scientists in Nazi Ger-
many
As a human capital shock I use the dismissal of Jewish and politically unreliablescientists
by the Nazi government. Just over two months after the National Socialist Party seized power
in 1933, the Nazi government passed the Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil
Serviceon the 7th of April of 1933. At once, all Jewish and politically unreliablepersons
were dismissed from civil service positions in Germany. Anybody with at least one Jewish
grandparent was to be dismissed. All civil servants therefore had to document their ancestry
and those with Jewish grandparents were dismissed from service. Scientists of Jewish origin
who had been civil servants since 1914 or who had lost a close family member in WWI were
initially exempted from the dismissals. In 1935, however, the Reich citizenship laws (Reichs-
bürgergesetz) revoked the exemption and remaining scientists of Jewish origin were ultimately
dismissed. The 1933 law was also used to dismiss civil servants with opposing political views.
All members of the Communist Party, for example, were classied as politically unreliable
persons and were dismissed. The law was immediately implemented and resulted in a wave of
dismissals and early retirements from the German universities.9
Overall, more than 1,000 academics were dismissed from the German universities. Shortly
after the annexation of Austria on the 12th of March, 1938 the law was also implemented in
Austrian universities. My calculations indicate that 15.0 percent of physicists, 14.1 percent of
chemists, and 18.7 percent of mathematicians were dismissed between 1933 and 1940 (Table
1). Most dismissals from German universities occurred in 1933, immediately after the law
was implemented. The small spike in dismissals in 1938 is driven by dismissals from Austrian
universities.10
Many dismissed scientists were outstanding members of their profession. On average, they
published more papers in top science journals and received more citations than scientists who
were not dismissed. While 15.0 percent of physicists were dismissed, they published 23.8 percent
of papers in top journals before 1933 and received 64 percent of the citations to papers published
before 1933. In chemistry, 14.1 percent were dismissed but they published 22 percent of the
papers in top journals, and received 23.4 percent of the citations. In mathematics, 18.7 percent
were dismissed, but they contributed 31.0 percent of the top journal publications, and received
61.3 percent of the citations (Table 1). Moreover, 11 current or future Nobel laureates were
of the number of scientists who disappear from the sample in each department (for non-retirement reasons) on
bombing destruction, the coe¢ cient on destruction interacted with the 1950 dummy is -0.006 with a p-value
of 0.43. The lack of a correlation of the bombings with the unexplained disappearance from the sample is not
surprising because the total number of bombing casualties was relatively low. Historians are still debating about
the exact number of bombing casualties but estimates range from 305,000 (United States Strategic Bombing
Survey, 1945, p. 95) which is probably an underestimate to between 750,000 and one million (Frankland, 2005,
p. 833 ) which may be too high. The German population at the beginning of WWII was about 69.3 million.
Therefore, between 0.4 and 1.4 percent of the German population was killed by Allied bombings.
9For more details on the dismissal of professors and the consequences for Ph.D. students and contemporaneous
e¤ects on faculty peers see Waldinger (2010, 2012).
10Dismissals that occurred in German universities after 1933 a¤ected researchers who had been exempted
under the clause for war veterans or for who had taken up their position before 1914. Furthermore, some
political dismissals occurred after 1933.
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dismissed.
My data do not allow me to identify whether researchers were dismissed because of their
Jewish origin or because of their political orientation. Historical studies, however, have shown
that about 87 percent of the dismissed in chemistry (Deichmann, 2001), and 79 percent of the
dismissed in mathematics (Siegmund-Schultze, 1998) were either Jewish or of Jewish decent.
The remaining dismissals occurred for political reasons.
Most of the dismissed scientists emigrated and the majority of them obtained positions
in foreign universities (Moser, Voena, and Waldinger, 2012). The main destinations were the
United States, the United Kingdom, Turkey, the British Mandate of Palestine (later Israel), and
Switzerland. A very small minority of the dismissed did not leave Germany and most of them
died in concentration camps or committed suicide. Extremely few managed to stay in Germany
and survive the Nazi regime, they were no longer allowed to use university laboratories and
other resources. As a result, they did not contribute to the scientic output of their former
departments.
The aggregate numbers hide the fact that German and Austrian universities were a¤ected
very di¤erently by the dismissals. Even within a university there was a lot of variation across
di¤erent departments. Some departments lost more than 60 percent of their personnel while
others remained completely una¤ected (Table 2). An example for the large variation in dis-
missals is the University of Heidelberg. It lost 60 percent of the mathematicians and almost
10 percent of chemists during the dismissals. In physics, however, not a single scientist was
dismissed.
2.2 Physical Capital Shock: Allied Bombings of Universities inWorld
War II
As physical capital shock I use destruction by allied bombings during WWII. At the beginning
of the war in 1939, the Royal Air Force (RAF) concentrated bombings on military targets, such
as the German eet. Other targets were only bombed after the German invasion of the Low
Countries and the bombing of Rotterdam by the Luftwa¤e in May, 1940. To avoid the German
antiaircraft defence the majority of bombing raids were own under the cover of darkness; this
made targeting extremely di¢ cult. During this period, the RAF mainly targeted oil reservoirs,
railway lines in the Ruhr area, aircraft factories, aerodromes, U-boat shipyards, and ports.
In the autumn of 1940, the RAF ew the rst area attackson German cities to a¤ect the
morale of the German people(Webster and Frankland, 1961 p. 156) and to concentrate the
maximum amount of damage in the centre of town(Peirse, 1940). The rst "area attack" was
own by 134 RAF bombers on December 16th, 1940, and targeted the inner city of Mannheim
in the south of Germany. The attack was a response to the devastation of Coventry by the
German Luftwa¤e during the autumn of 1940.
During 1941, the RAF increased the number of small scale "area attacks" on German cities.
Most of these attacks, however, did not cause any large destruction as only about 20 percent
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of bombers managed to navigate within ve miles of their destination, even less managed to
hit the target. As a result, the smallest potential targets were whole towns (Frankland, 2005,
Webster and Frankland, 1961, vol. 1, p.156, p.257). Even these were often missed. A bombing
raid of Karlsruhe and Stuttgart on October 1st, 1941, for example, not only hit the two targets
but also 25 other cities such as Aachen, Chemnitz, or Würzburg, several hundred kilometers
away (Webster and Frankland, 1961, vol. 1, p. 185).
The appointment of Sir Arthur Harris as head of "Bomber Command" on February 23rd,
1942, and the Area Bombing Directivethat was issued a week earlier caused an intensication
of the bombing campaign as more planes were deployed in each raid. An example is the rst
1,000 bomber attack against Cologne on May 30th, 1942. The raid damaged about a third of
Colognes surface area (Hohn, 1991 p.12, Webster and Frankland, 1961, vol. 1, p. 340, pp. 402-
410).11 To maximize destruction of inner cities the RAF used incendiary bombs that caused
great res in bombed cities. The introduction of heavy bombers (in particular the Lancaster
bomber that was gradually introduced after March, 1942), the use of radar and radar-like
devices (introduced in March, 1942), and the deployment of Pathnder target marking planes
(rst used in January, 1943) increased the precision and e¢ ciency of bombings.
In January, 1943, the United States Army Air Force (USAAF) entered the bombing cam-
paign against Germany.12 While the British continued to y night time raids and in particular
"area attacks" against inner cities, the USAAF mostly attacked during the day and bombed
strategically important targets such as the German aircraft and ball bearings industries.
The bombing of targets in Germany intensied in 1944 with the introduction of the double
blowtactic. Two, or later three, bombing attacks over short time periods increased the e¢ cacy
of incendiary bombs. The increased air supremacy of the Allied forces further facilitated the
bombings. Towards the end of the war the bombardments were extended to smaller cities that
had been spared in previous attacks.
Overall, about 1.35 million tons of bombs were dropped over German territory duringWWII.
Data on monthly bomb loads show an almost continuous increase between 1940 and 1945, with
particularly large increases in the last years of the war (Figure 1).
11The previous 107 attacks on Cologne had involved at most 40 planes each.
12While the rst months of the US air o¤ensive against Germany were only moderately successful, the e¤ec-
tiveness of USAAF operations greatly improved towards the end of 1943. These changes were achieved by an
increase in the production of bombers, by the introduction of long-range Mustang ghters which gave bomber
formations added protection, and by the establishment of U.S. air bases in Italy.
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Figure 1: Allied bombings
Note: The gure shows the monthly amount of bombs (in tons), that was dropped on German territory during WWII. Data source:
Webster and Frankland (1961), Annex.
Allied bombings, in particular during the last two years of WWII, completely destroyed
about 18.5 percent of homes in what later became the Federal Republic of Germany (Hohn,
1991, p. 59). As area bombings targeted the inner cities of all larger cities they were most
heavily a¤ected.
Universities were never listed as targets in any of the Allied bombing directives and sim-
ilar documents. Nonetheless, many university facilities were destroyed because bombs could
not be precisely aimed until the end of WWII. Because of the targeting problems bombs fell
relatively randomly within cities and there was large variation in destruction across di¤erent
university departments (Table 2). Targeting buildings of particular departments would have
been impossible. Because many bombing raids involved the use of incendiary bombs, res in
a¤ected buildings destroyed most of the scientic equipment and important manuscripts that
had not been relocated to safer locations.13 The res also destroyed many of the valuable
private libraries that professors had assembled during their career.
As bombings intensied in 1944 most science departments were hit in 1944 and 1945. For
some universities I obtain exact dates for the rst and last bombing raid that destroyed uni-
versity buildings. According to these data, the rst raid occurred in June, 1941, and destroyed
buildings at the Technical University of Aachen. Bombing raids that hit other universities
continued and intensied until the end of WWII.
After the end of the war on May 8th, 1945 reconstruction of university buildings was initially
hampered by a lack of funds and skilled craftsmen, missing supplies, and the devastation of
13Many departments relocated material to safer town but even those were often bombed later on. The
theoretical physics section of the University of Bonn, for example, moved equipment to Hildburghausen in
Thuringia but the temporary site was bombed towards the end of the war (van Rey, 1995 p. 36).
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many German cities. Most universities enlisted students to help with reconstruction. The
universities of Bonn, Karlsruhe, and Hannover, for example, required up to 1,000 reconstruction
service hours from its students until 1949 (van Rey, 1995 p. 42, Hoepke, 2007 p. 137, Wolters,
1950 pp. 123-129). Most universities completed reconstruction by the end of the 1950s but
some work lasted until the 1960s (Hoepke, 2007 p. 139, Technische Universität Dresden 1996,
pp. 18-36).
3 Panel Data Set of German Science Departments
3.1 Scientists in German and Austrian Universities from 1926 to
1980
To evaluate the impact and persistence of the two shocks on the productivity of science depart-
ments I construct a new panel data set covering physicists, chemists, and mathematicians at
German and Austrian universities. The data come from Kürschners Deutscher Gelehrtenkalen-
der that has been published since the 1920s in 5 to 10 year intervals. Data from volumes
published in 1926, 1931, 1940/41, 1950, 1961, 1970, and 1980 allow me to construct complete
faculty rosters for science departments at these seven points in time, spanning 54 years. From
each volume I extract all scientists who were chaired professors, extraordinary professors, or
Privatdozenten(the rst position in the German university system with the right to give lec-
tures).14 To obtain a sample that is comparable over time, I focus on scientists in all 35 German
or Austrian universities that existed in 1926 and remained on German (both FRG and GDR)
or Austrian territory after 1945 (see Table 2 for a listing of the universities in my sample).15
As I obtain data on physics, chemistry, and mathematics departments in each university, the
nal data set contains 105 science departments.16 The data appendix provides more details on
the scientists data.
The micro data include 5,716 scientists (2,456 chemists, 2,000 physicists, and 1,260 mathe-
maticians) with 10,387 person-year observations (4,605 in chemistry, 3,594 in physics, and 2,188
in mathematics). The number of scientists in German and Austrian universities increased mas-
sively after 1926. The exception is 1941 (and 1950 in chemistry), the rst data point after the
dismissal of scientists (Figure 2).
14Privatdozenten are comparable to junior faculty at U.S. universities. Extraordinary professors are compa-
rable to associate professors and chaired professors are comparable to full professors in the U.S. system.
15This excludes three universities (the University of Breslau, nowWroclaw, the Technical University of Breslau
and the University of Königsberg, now Kaliningrad) that were on German territory in 1926 but became part of
Poland or the Soviet Union after 1945. As the "Gelehrtenkalender" no longer listed researchers from these three
universities after 1945 they cannot be included in the long-term analysis. Most scientists from these universities
relocated to universities that continued to be in Germany after 1945.
16Scientists in universities located in the GDR were not listed in the "Gelehrtenkalender" in 1980.
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Figure 2: Number of scientists 1926-1980
Note: The gure reports the number of scientists in German and Austrian universities in chemistry, physics, and mathematics at
each of the 7 points in time covered by the data. Data come from Kürschners Deutscher Gelehrtenkalender (see text for details).
3.2 Productivity Measures for German and Austrian Science De-
partments
Tomeasure productivity at the department level I rst obtain publications and citation weighted
publications for each scientist in the sample. The publication data are downloaded from the
"ISI Web of Science" and include all top journals for German and Austrian scientists. As
journal rankings changed over time, I download both historical and current top journals.
The list of historical top journals includes all science journals published in Germany and are
covered by the Web of Science between 1920 and 1944.17 I add a number of general science
journals (e.g. Nature and Science) and historically relevant international eld journals (e.g.
Acta Mathematica) that were outlets for German scientists in the 1920s and 30s. I augment
the list of historical top journals with a set of current top journals that I obtain from commonly
used journal rankings. See Table A1 for the complete list of top journals used in the analysis
and the data appendix for additional information on the journal data.
I download all articles published between 1920 and 1985 in any of the journals in my list.18 I
17Historical journals with coverage in the Web of Science were the top journals at their time be-
cause Thomson Scientic digitized only the most cited journals for the period 1900 to 1944. See
http://wokinfo.com/products_tools/backles/cos/ for further information on the digitization of historical top
journals.
18A few top journals, such as Physical Review Letters, were founded after 1920. For these journals I download
all articles after their creation. The changing pool of journals does not a¤ect my ndings as all regressions include
year xed e¤ects.
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can therefore calculate the number of top journal publications (and citation weighted publica-
tions) for each scientist.19 The Web of Science data only include the last name and the initial of
the rst name (or two initials if the author uses two rst names) for each author. Most German
scientists have distinct last names that are also di¤erent from most foreign names. In the rare
cases that the last name - rst initial combination does not uniquely identify a scientist in
my data I split (citation weighted) publications according to the number of scientists with the
same last name - rst initial combination. Table A2 shows the most cited scientists in my data.
Most of these scientists are very well known in the scientic community. This indicates that
the productivity measures carry meaningful information. Interestingly, Johann von Neumann
who later emigrated to the United States is the most cited mathematician in the data.
To measure department productivity for each of the seven points in time I add individual pro-
ductivity measures within departments. Individual productivity is measured using a ve year
window around the relevant year. Albert Einsteins individual productivity measure for 1926,
for example, is the sum of his publications between 1923 and 1927.20 I then sum these individ-
ual productivities within departments. Say a department had three scientists with individual
productivities equal to 1, 2, and 3; total department productivity would then be 1+2+3=6.
The Web of Science data not only include publications but also the number of times each article
was subsequently cited in any journal covered by the Web of Science. I can therefore construct
an additional productivity measure based on citation weighted publications.21
Publication and citation patterns are very di¤erent across the three subjects. To ensure
comparability across subjects I normalize total department productivity to have zero mean
and unit variance in each subject. This also allows for easy interpretation of the estimated
regression coe¢ cients.
3.3 Data on Dismissals
I obtain data on dismissed scientists from a number of sources. The main source is the List of
Displaced German Scholars. It was compiled by the relief organization Emergency Alliance
of German Scholars Abroad that had been founded by some dismissed scientists with the
purpose of supporting other dismissed scholars to nd positions in foreign universities. The list
was published in 1937 and contained about 1,650 names of dismissed researchers. I extract all
19To reduce measurement error I focus on publications that correspond to the scientists subject. For physi-
cists, for example, I only use publications in top physics and general science journals that are outlets for
physicists. I do not consider possible publications in chemistry journals. While this may underestimate the
publications of some scientists it is preferable to counting large numbers of irrelevant publications because the
last name - rst initial combination does not perfectly identify scientists, especially across elds.
20Publications are measured using an asymmetric window around the relevant year of the "Gelehrtenkalen-
der"; i.e. productivity for the faculty in 1926 is measured with publications between 1923 and 1927 (instead
of publications between 1924 and 1928). This asymmetry accounts for the delay in the publication of the
"Gelehrtenkalender" as questionnaires for a certain volume had to be sent out and returned before publication.
Using a symmetric window to compute average productivities does not a¤ect the results.
21The citation weighted productivity measure is constructed as above by adding all citations to publications
published in a ve year window around the relevant year. For 1926, for example, I add all citations to articles
published between 1923 and 1927. Citations are counted until today.
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dismissed physicists, chemists, and mathematicians from the "List".
As the Listwas published before 1938 it did not include dismissals from Austrian univer-
sities. I consult the Biographisches Handbuch der deutschsprachigen Emigration nach 1933 -
Vol. II : The arts, sciences, and literature (1983) to obtain dismissals from Austria.22 This
source also contains a few additional dismissals from German universities, for example, because
dismissed scientists passed away before the List of Displaced German Scholarswas compiled.
The two sources together cover about 90 percent of all dismissals. I augment this information
with data on a few additional dismissals from three secondary sources compiled by historians
who have studied the dismissal of scientists in Nazi Germany.23
3.4 Data on Bombings of Science Departments
No existing data set covers bombing destruction of German and Austrian science departments.
To measure department level bombing destruction, I therefore assemble a new data set from
information in university archives. Bombed university institutes often provided detailed reports
of destruction levels to obtain funds and materials for reconstruction. I construct departmental
destruction using information from these reports that I obtain in a two-step process.
First, I contacted university archivists and asked them for information on destruction levels
for all buildings used by physicists, chemists, and mathematicians. In some cases departments
did not report destruction in percentages but instead gave verbal descriptions of bombing
damages. I convert this information into percentage destruction using a rule outlined in the
data appendix. For universities where archivists could not provide destruction information, I
or my research assistant personally consulted the historical reports in the respective university
archive to obtain the missing information.24
To analyze the importance of measurement error I also construct a measure of bombing
destruction at the university level. The data for this alternative measure come from information
on university websites and a number of additional sources (Tietze, 1995, Phillips, 1983, Samuel
and Thomas, 1949, Schneider, 1990, and Cheval, 1991). The data appendix provides additional
details on the destruction data.
3.5 Data on Control Variables
To investigate the robustness of my ndings to the inclusion of additional controls I obtain data
on university age, the creation of nearby universities, the share of rms in armament related
22The Handbuch was jointly compiled by the Institut für Zeitgeschichte München and the Research
Foundation for Jewish Immigration New York. I use information contained in Kröner (1983) to extract all
dismissed scientists from the Handbuch.
23Dismissed chemists are contained in Deichmann (2001), dismissed physicists in Beyerchen (1977) and dis-
missed mathematicians in Siegmund-Schultze (1998).
24This two-step method did not yield department level destruction data for the University of Darmstadt. I
therefore use university level destruction for this university.
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industries in 1933, the fraction of Jews at the city level in 1933, and the distance to the iron
curtain. Further information on the control variables can be found in the data appendix.
Combining the data from all sources I obtain a panel data set of German and Austrian
science departments that I observe at seven points in time (1926, 1931, 1940, 1950, 1961, 1970,
and 1980). The data include di¤erent measures of department productivity, information on
dismissal and bombing shocks, and time-varying control variables.
4 Persistence of Human and Physical Capital Shocks
4.1 Main Results
I investigate the persistence of the human and physical capital shocks by estimating equation
(1). First, I analyze how the dismissal shock a¤ected the productivity of science departments.
As dismissals occurred between 1933 and 1940, with most dismissals happening in 1933, the
rst post-dismissal observation is 1940. Regression results indicate that between 1931 (the last
data point before the dismissals) and 1940 productivity in departments with dismissals fell
signicantly compared to departments without dismissals (Table 3, column 1). Coe¢ cients on
the interactions with subsequent years indicate that this e¤ect persisted until 1980. Controlling
for subject times year xed e¤ects to allow for di¤erential productivity trends in the three
subjects does not a¤ect the results (column 2). Further controlling for occupation zone (U.S.
zone, U.K. zone, French zone, Soviet zone) times post-1945 dummies has a negligible e¤ect
on estimated coe¢ cients but lowers standard errors (column 3). The estimates imply that the
dismissal of one scientist lowered department productivity, even the long run, by between 0.17
and 0.28 standard deviations (column 3).
I next analyze how the bombing shock a¤ected productivity. As Allied bombings intensied
towards the end of the war, the rst post-bombing observation is 1950. The estimates indicate
that productivity of departments that were bombed during WWII declined between 1941 and
1950 compared to other departments. This e¤ect is only signicant at the 5 percent level
if I control for subject times year xed e¤ects and occupation zone times post-1945 dummies
(Table 3, columns 4 to 6). The estimates imply that the destruction of 10 percent of department
buildings lowered productivity by 0.05 standard deviations. Productivity recovered very quickly
after WWII. Already in 1961, there was no signicant di¤erence between departments that were
bombed during WWII and other departments. By 1970, departments that were bombed even
performed slightly better than other departments. While these results are only signicant
at the 10 percent level in two of the three specications they suggest that upgrading during
reconstruction may have had a small positive e¤ect on the productivity of bombed departments
in the longer-run.
Jointly estimating long-run e¤ects of the bombing and dismissal shocks leads to very similar
conclusions (Table 3, columns 7 to 9). To investigate whether the bombing results are driven
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by the destruction of department buildings or by more general destruction at the city level, I
add interactions of year dummies with city level destruction to the regression. The results do
not change substantially (Table 3, column 10). This indicates that productivity is primarily
driven by department facilities and not by more general city level e¤ects.
To investigate the relative magnitude of the two shocks I plot the e¤ect of 10 percent shocks
to the human and physical capital of a hypothetical science department. For this exercise I scale
coe¢ cients and standard errors as reported in column (10) of Table 3 to reect a 10 percent
shock to both human and physical capital.25
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Figure 3: Persistence of 10% shocks - publications
Note: The gure plots scaled regression coe¢ cients and 95 percent condence intervals obtained from the estimation of equation
(1) as reported in column (10) of Table 3. Point estimates and condence intervals are scaled to reect a 10 percent shock to both
human and physical capital. The dependent variable is the total number of publications in department d and year t. The left hand
panel reports coe¢ cients on the interaction of the number of dismissals (between 1933 and 1940) with year dummies. The excluded
year is 1931; the last data point before the dismissals. The right hand panel reports coe¢ cients on the interaction of percentage
destruction (by Allied bombings between 1941 and 1945) with year dummies. The excluded year is 1940; the last data point before
the bombings.
The exercise reveals that a 10 percent shock to human capital had a larger e¤ect on pro-
ductivity than a 10 percent shock to physical capital, even in 1950 (Figure 3).26 While the
human capital shock persisted for more than 40 years, until 1980, the physical capital shock
dissipated quickly and even had a small positive e¤ect on departmental productivity in 1970.
The gure also shows that pre-trends are unlikely to drive the human capital results. For the
bombing shock the coe¢ cient on the interaction of the 1931 dummy with WWII destruction is
negative and signicant. This indicates that the productivity of departments that were bombed
25Average department size in 1931 was 10.15. A 10 percent shock to human capital therefore corresponds to
losing 1.015 scientists. I therefore multiply the dismissal coe¢ cients and standard errors reported in column (10)
of Table 3 by 1.015. As departmental destruction is already measured in percentages, I multiply the bombing
coe¢ cients and standard errors reported in column (10) of Table 3 by 10.
26In 1950, the p-value of a test of the Null hypothesis (1.015*coe¢ cient # dismissed*1950) = (10*coe¢ cient
% destruction*1950) has a p-value of 0.097. For all later years, the e¤ect of a 10 percent human capital shock
is signicantly larger (at the 5 percent level) than a 10 percent physical capital shock (p-values between 0.001
and 0.012).
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during WWII improved before the bombings occurred. This pre-trend suggests that the e¤ect
of bombing destruction may be underestimated in 1950. I show below, that controlling for
other factors that may have a¤ected productivity reduces the magnitude and signicance of
the pre-war bombing coe¢ cients while leaving the post-war results unchanged.
In the previous results productivity was measured as the sum of publications in top journals
(normalized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one). Alternatively, productivity
could be measured by citation weighted publications. This measure multiplies publications by
the number of subsequent citations in articles that were published in any journal covered by
the Web of Science (again normalized to have a mean of 0 and unit variance). The citations
quantify the quality of each published paper using valuations of the entire scientic community.
The alternative productivity measure yields very similar results (Table 4). The dismissal of
one scientist reduced productivity, even in the long run, by between 0.16 and 0.22 standard
deviations (column 10). Bombings had a small negative, but insignicant, e¤ect in 1950.
By 1970, bombed departments even performed slightly better (signicant at the 10 percent
level). Figure 4 plots the long-run e¤ects of 10 percent shocks to human and physical capital
corresponding to the estimates reported in column (10) of Table 4. The dismissal shock had a
larger e¤ect than the bombing shock and was much more persistent.27
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Figure 4: Persistence of 10% shocks - citation weighted publications
Note: The gure plots scaled regression coe¢ cients and 95 percent condence intervals obtained from the estimation of equation
(1) as reported in column (10) of Table 4. Point estimates and condence intervals are scaled to reect a 10 percent shock to both
human and physical capital. The dependent variable is the total number of citation weighted publications in department d and
year t. The left hand panel reports coe¢ cients on the interaction of the number of dismissals (between 1933 and 1940) with year
dummies. The excluded year is 1931; the last data point before the dismissals. The right hand panel reports coe¢ cients on the
interaction of percentage destruction (by Allied bombings between 1941 and 1945) with year dummies. The excluded year is 1940;
the last data point before the bombings.
27The test of the Null hypotheses (1.015*coe¢ cient # dismissed*year dummy) = (10*coe¢ cient % destruc-
tion*year dummy) has p-values between 0.000 and 0.011.
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4.2 Robustness of Main Results
In the following, I show that the results are robust to the inclusion of additional control variables,
to the adjustment of productivity for changes in the age-structure of a department, and to the
use of di¤erent samples. I also investigate whether the way I dene the two shocks variables or
measurement error in the destruction variable are driving my ndings.
Additional Controls
After WWII, federal states (Länder) became responsible for universities in West Germany.
To investigate whether these changes were correlated with the shocks and therefore a¤ect my
results, I add interactions of federal state indicators with a post-1945 dummy to the regression.28
Reassuringly, the results remain almost unchanged (Tables 5 and 6, column 1).
In a further robustness check, I add university age and its square to the regression. The
specication allows me to rule out that the two shocks disproportionately a¤ected older (or
younger) universities that may have been on di¤erent productivity trends. The results are
almost una¤ected (Tables 5 and 6, column 2).
During the post-war period, in particular during the 1960s and 1970s, a number of new uni-
versities were founded in Germany and Austria. Increased competition from these universities
may have inuenced the productivity of established departments. To investigate whether my
results are a¤ected by these changes I include a time-varying control that measures the number
of departments within 50 kilometers of each science department. The results remain unchanged
(Tables 5 and 6, column 3).
After the Nazi government seized power in 1933, it invested heavily in rearmament (Tooze,
2006). As this investment was concentrated in a few industries it may have a¤ected department
productivity in cities with rms that benetted from rearmament spending, either directly
through spillovers from industry to universities or because the Allies may have targeted these
cities during the bombing campaign. I therefore interact the share of rms in three armament
related industries with year dummies and include these interactions as additional controls.29
Reassuringly, the results are a¤ected very little (Tables 5 and 6, column 4).
Departments with more Jewish scientists may have been located in cities with a higher frac-
tion of Jewish residents. The disappearance of the Jewish population may have had long-lasting
e¤ects on these cities (e.g. Akbulut-Yuksel and Yuksel, 2011, Acemoglu, Hassan, Robinson,
2011, and Grosfeld, Rodnyansky, and Zhuravskaya, 2011) that could have a¤ected the produc-
tivity of science departments in the long run. To investigate whether the results are a¤ected by
28The GDR was a centralized state and did not re-introduce federal states after WWII. I therefore include a
joint indicator for all universities in East Germany (including the Technical University of Berlin that was located
in West Berlin) in the regression. The federal states of Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein had one university
only and I therefore combine them with the adjacent state of Niedersachsen. The ve Austrian universities are
covered by a joint indicator. Including interactions of separate indicators for states with only one university
with a post-1945 indicator hardly a¤ects the results.
29The three armament relevant industries are iron and steel production, mechanical engineering and vehicle
construction, and chemicals. The shares of rms in these industries are measured in 1933 (1930 for Austrian
cities). They are therefore determined before the Nazi government seized power and are therefore not endoge-
nously a¤ected by the two shocks.
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these changes, I add the interaction of a post-1945 dummy with the fraction of Jews at the city
level in 1933 to the regression.30 If anything, the dismissal coe¢ cients become slightly more
negative (Tables 5 and 6, column 5). This indicates that the extinction of Jews from German
and Austrian cities is not driving the results.
Finally, I investigate whether the two shocks were correlated with the geographic location
of universities. Universities in cities that were closer to the iron curtainmay have su¤ered
after 1945, because these cities experienced a decline in population growth after the division
of Germany (Redding and Sturm, 2008). To investigate this concern I add the interaction of a
post-1945 dummy with distance to the iron curtain to the regression. The results are unchanged
(Tables 5 and 6, column 6).
Figure 5 shows the e¤ect of 10 percent shocks including all controls. The gure looks very
similar to the gure with the limited set of controls (Figure 3). This suggests that my ndings
are not driven by other factors that may have a¤ected productivity. The gure also shows that
the addition of controls reduces the magnitude and signicance of pre-trends for the bombing
results while leaving the e¤ect in 1950 unchanged.
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Figure 5: Persistence of 10% shocks - publications with all controls
Note: The gure plots scaled regression coe¢ cients and 95 percent condence intervals obtained from the estimation of equation
(1) as reported in column (6) of Table 5. Point estimates and condence intervals are scaled to reect a 10 percent shock to both
human and physical capital. The dependent variable is the total number of publications in department d and year t. The left hand
panel reports coe¢ cients on the interaction of the number of dismissals (between 1933 and 1940) with year dummies. The excluded
year is 1931; the last data point before the dismissals. The right hand panel reports coe¢ cients on the interaction of percentage
destruction (by Allied bombings between 1941 and 1945) with year dummies. The excluded year is 1940; the last data point before
the bombings.
Figure 6 shows the e¤ect of 10 percent shocks for the citation-weighted productivity measure
including all controls. It also looks similar to the gure with the limed set of controls (Figure
4). The small uptick in productivity in 1980 is less pronounced if I add additional controls to
the regression.
30For Austrian cities the fraction of Jews at the city level is measured in 1934 (Wien) and 1938 (Graz and
Innsbruck) and thus before the annexation of Austria by Nazi Germany in 1938.
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Figure 6: Persistence of 10% shocks - citation weighted publications with all controls
Note: The gure plots scaled regression coe¢ cients and 95 percent condence intervals obtained from the estimation of equation
(1) as reported in column (6) of Table 7. Point estimates and condence intervals are scaled to reect a 10 percent shock to both
human and physical capital. The dependent variable is the total number of publications in department d and year t. The left hand
panel reports coe¢ cients on the interaction of the number of dismissals (between 1933 and 1940) with year dummies. The excluded
year is 1931; the last data point before the dismissals. The right hand panel reports coe¢ cients on the interaction of percentage
destruction (by Allied bombings between 1941 and 1945) with year dummies. The excluded year is 1940; the last data point before
the bombings.
The productivity of scientists follows a concave pattern over their lifetime (Levin and
Stephan, 1991). Some of the changes in the age structure of departments are endogenous to
the dismissals because departments with dismissals may have had to hire younger researchers,
for example. In this case one should not control for these changes. Nonetheless, I investigate
whether the results are driven by changes in the age structure of a¤ected departments. I there-
fore adjust output by regressing individual productivity measures on a full set of age dummies
(in 5 year bins). The residuals from this regression are then used to construct department
productivity that I normalize to have a zero mean and a standard deviation of one. Using
age-adjusted productivity as the dependent variable yields very similar results (Tables 5 and 6,
column 7).
Di¤erent Samples
The main results were estimated with all German and Austrian universities that existed
before 1926. Dropping Austrian science departments from the sample does not a¤ect the
results (Tables 5 and 6, column 8). The main sample includes all German universities that
were based within the German borders of 1990, both in the FRG and the GDR. Reconstruction
and re-hiring may have been di¤erent in the GDR compared to the market economy of the
FRG. Dropping East German departments from the sample only slightly reduces the absolute
magnitude of the coe¢ cients suggesting that the results are not primarily driven by a di¤erent
development in the GDR (Tables 5 and 6, column 9). These results also demonstrate that the
special situation of the University of Berlin that was located in the Soviet sector does not drive
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the results.31 The results are also robust to dropping both Austria and the GDR from the
sample (Tables 5 and 6, column 10).
Di¤erent Shock Measures
As outlined above, most dismissals took place during the rst years of the Nazi regime.
Restricting the dismissals to these early dismissals (as in Waldinger, 2010) the results remain
very similar (Tables 5 and 6, column 11).
The dismissal shock was conned to particular departments because the training of scientists
is very subject specic. As a result, universities could not reallocate physicists to chemistry
departments if a university had many dismissals in chemistry but few in physics. Following a
bombing shock, however, universities could reallocate buildings across departments. This could
have mitigated any negative e¤ects of bombing destruction.
To investigate whether the reallocation of buildings is a¤ecting the results, I measure de-
struction with average destruction in all science departments instead of destruction of individual
science departments. Estimating the model with this alternative measure yields a more neg-
ative coe¢ cient for 1950. The destruction of an additional 10 percent of science buildings
lowered productivity by 0.11 instead of 0.05 standard deviations (Table 5, columns 6 and 12).
In regressions that use citation weighted productivity as the dependent variable, the 1950 co-
e¢ cient changes from -0.04 to -0.08 when I use average destruction in all science departments
instead of the subject specic measure (Table 6, columns 6 and 12). These results suggest
that universities could indeed mitigate some of the short-run e¤ects of bombings by reallocat-
ing buildings across departments. When I measure the physical capital shock with average
destruction across all science departments the negative e¤ect persists until 1961 (signicant at
the 10 percent level) for the publication based productivity measure (Table 5, column 12) but
not for the citation-weighted productivity measure (Table 6, column 12). By 1970, bombed
departments had completely recovered independently of the destruction and productivity mea-
sures. In fact, citation-weighted productivity was signicantly higher in bombed departments
in 1970. This further suggests that bombed departments benetted from upgrading during
reconstruction.
Measurement Error in Bombing Destruction
The destruction measure of some departments may contain measurement error. To investi-
gate how much measurement error attenuates the bombing results I instrument for department
level destruction with a measure of bombing destruction at the university level.32 University
level destruction was obtained from di¤erent data sources than the department level measure
(see data appendix). As a result, the two measurement errors should be uncorrelated. The in-
strumental variable strategy should therefore minimize attenuation bias. First stage regressions
are reported in Table A3 and indicate that university level destruction is a strong predictor of
31The University of Berlin was located in the Soviet sector of Berlin. It reopened in January 1946 (and was
renamed into Humboldt University in 1949). In 1948, the Free University of Berlin was founded in the American
sector of Berlin.
32As the university level destruction measure captures destruction of all university buildings it is di¤erent
from the average destruction in science departments that has been used above.
20
department level destruction.33 The instrumental variable results indicate that productivity in
departments with 10 percent more destruction fell by 0.13 standard deviations in 1950. In 1961,
departments with 10 percent more bombing destruction still had 0.11 standard deviations lower
productivity. By 1970, however, productivity had recovered in bombed departments (Table 5,
column 13). Equivalent results for citation-weighted publications indicate that productivity in
departments with 10 percent more destruction fell by 0.08 standard deviations in 1950, and
0.05 standard deviations (signicant at the 10 percent level) in 1961. By 1970, productivity had
completely recovered (Table 6, column 13). These results suggest that measurement error may
indeed attenuate the bombing results for 1950 and 1961. The nding that bombed departments
had completely recovered by 1970, however, is not distorted by measurement error.
Interactions of Human and Physical Capital Shocks
The regression model estimated above does not allow for interactions of human and physical
capital. To investigate whether such interactions are important I add triple interactions of #
dismissed, % destruction, and year dummies to the regression. I.e. I estimate
Outputdt = 1 +
P
t 2tHCShock(1933-40)d * Yeart +
P
t 3t PCShock(1942-45)d * Yeart
+
P
t 4t HCShock(1933-40)d * PCShock(1942-45)d * Yeart
+ 5 DepartmentFEd + 6YearFEt + "dt (2)
The rst data point that could have been a¤ected by both shocks is 1950. I therefore include
the triple interactions for the years 1950, 1961, 1970, and 1980. The publication results show
that departments with dismissals that were then bombed during WWII did signicantly worse
than other departments in 1950. The estimated coe¢ cient indicates a reduction in publications
by 0.03 standard deviations in departments that lost one scientist and then lost 10 percent of
department buildings. As departments recovered quickly from the physical capital shock triple
interactions with later years are no longer signicant. (Table A4, column 2). For the citation
weighted productivity measure all triple interactions are insignicant (Table A4, column 4).
The dismissal results are remarkably robust to the inclusion of the triple interactions. The
ndings suggest that there are some complementarities between human and physical capital
but that these are relatively minor. Furthermore, human capital e¤ects are not driven by
important complementarities with physical capital.
33As I instrument for all interactions of year dummies with department level destruction, I estimate six rst
stage regressions: one for the interaction of % subject destruction with the 1926 dummy, one for the interaction
of % subject destruction with the 1931 dummy, and so on. As a result, the usual F-test on the excluded
instruments is not appropriate in this context. Stock and Yogo (2005) propose a test for weak instruments
based on the Cragg-Donald (1993) Eigenvalue Statistic. Stock and Yogo (2005) only provide critical values for
up to two endogenous regressors. With two endogenous regressors and two instruments the critical value is 7.03.
Here, I use six instruments for six endogenous regressors. Appropriate critical values should be lower than 7.03.
The Cragg-Donald EV statistic reported in Table A3 is 19.6. Weak instruments should therefore not bias the
results.
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4.3 Subject Specic Results
Data on the three subjects allow me to investigate whether the human and physical capital
shocks had di¤erential e¤ects across disciplines. While physical capital may be more important
in chemistry and some elds of physics (experimental physics, technical physics, or astrophysics)
it is presumably less important in mathematics. The estimation results, however, indicate that
the productivity e¤ects of physical capital did not di¤er across elds (Table 7).
Despite the fact that most results are less precisely estimated because of smaller sample
sizes, the dismissal results reveal interesting di¤erences across subjects. If one considers citation
weighted productivity, the results are largest and most persistent in mathematics, followed by
physics (even though most coe¢ cients in physics are not signicant), and then chemistry (Table
7, columns 2, 4, and 6). These results suggests that high quality scientists are particularly
important as dismissals in mathematics and physics were of higher quality than in chemistry
(Table 1).
4.4 The E¤ect of High Quality Scientists
To further investigate this hypothesis I assign scientists to quality percentiles based on their
pre-dismissal citation weighted publications. I then investigate how the dismissal of high qual-
ity scientists a¤ected department productivity in the long run. Corresponding to the main
specication reported above, the dismissal of one scientist lowered department productivity
by between 0.18 and 0.32 standard deviations (Table 8, columns 1 and 2). The dismissal of
an above median quality scientist lowered productivity by between 0.24 and 0.50 standard
deviations (columns 3 and 4). The dismissal of higher quality scientists caused even larger pro-
ductivity reductions that persisted in the long run. The dismissal of a scientist in the top 5th
percentile led to a productivity reduction of 0.7 to 1.6 standard deviations (columns 9 and 10).
Figure 7 summarizes these ndings graphically.34 The gure shows the relative productivity
drop after the dismissal of a scientist of the relevant quality group. The higher the quality of
dismissals the larger the long-run productivity decline.35
34To improve the clarity of the gure I do not report condence intervals. The majority of estimated coe¢ -
cients are signicantly di¤erent from 0 (Table 8).
35In regressions not reported here I investigate whether the dismissal results are entirely driven by very high
quality scientists. For these test I exclude dismissed scientists whose citation-weighted publications place them
in the top 5th percentile when I construct the dismissal variable. The e¤ect of dismissals remains signicant
when I use this alternative dismissal measure.
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Figure 7: Persistence of high quality dismissals
Note: The gure plots regression coe¢ cients reported in Table 8. The dependent variable is the total number of citation weighted
publications in department d and year t. The top line reports coe¢ cients on the interaction of the number of dismissals (between
1933 and 1940) with year dummies as in column (2) of Table 8. The second line from the top reports coe¢ cients on the interaction
of the number of dismissals of above median quality with year dummies as in column (4). The third line from the top reports
coe¢ cients on the interaction of the number of dismissals of scientists in the top 25th percentile with year dummies as in column (6),
and so on. The excluded year is 1931. The regression also includes the interaction of percentage destruction with year dummies.
To improve clarity, 95 percent condence intervals are omitted from the graph. The large majority of regression coe¢ cients is
signicantly di¤erent from 0 (Table 8).
5 Mechanisms for the Persistence of the Human Capital
Shock
The results indicate that human capital is particularly important for the productivity of science
departments. Furthermore, I nd strong persistence of the human capital shock, with especially
large declines after the dismissal of high quality scientists. In the following, I investigate pos-
sible mechanisms for the long-run persistence of the temporary dismissal shock. One possible
explanation could be a fall department size from which departments never recovered. I investi-
gate this hypothesis by regressing department size on the dismissal and destruction variables.
Department size in departments with dismissals was signicantly smaller until 1970 but by 1980
it had completely recovered (Table 9). These results indicate that a fall in department size can
only explain some of the persistence of the human capital shock.
A related mechanism for the persistence of the human capital shock may be a permanent fall
in the quality of hires. Star scientistsare often instrumental in attracting other high quality
faculty. Before 1933, for example, the great mathematician David Hilbert was instrumental
in attracting theoretical physicist Max Born (Nobel Prize, 1954) to the University of Göttin-
gen. Max Born then used his inuence to hire experimental physicist James Franck (Nobel
23
Prize, 1925) (Jungk, 1963 pp. 22-23). Born and Franck were dismissed from the University
of Göttingen in 1933. It is quite likely that these and other dismissals had permanent e¤ects
on the quality of subsequent hires. I therefore investigate whether hiring quality declined in
departments with dismissals. I also analyze whether the dismissal of high quality scientists
caused particularly large reductions in the quality of new hires. To identify hires I need to
observe changes in the composition of departments. As a result, I can measure the quality of
hires from 1931 onwards. For 1931, I classify all scientists who joined a department between
1926 and 1931 as a hire and measure the average quality of these hires.36 I construct equivalent
measures for the quality of hires in subsequent years.
I regress average hiring quality on the number of dismissals interacted with year indicators.
The dismissal of one scientist lowered hiring quality by between 0.05 and 0.06 standard devia-
tions. Estimated e¤ects are signicant for all years and persist until 1980 (Table 10, column 1).
Additional results show that hiring quality dropped more after losing high quality scientists,
in particular after losing scientists of exceptional quality (columns 2 to 5). Figure 8 shows the
reduction in hiring quality after the dismissal of scientists with di¤erent qualities.
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Figure 8: Quality of hires
Note: The gure plots regression coe¢ cients as reported in Table 10. The dependent variable is quality of new hires in department
d and year t. The top line reports coe¢ cients on the interaction of the number of dismissals (between 1933 and 1940) with year
dummies as in column (1) of Table 10. The second line from the top reports coe¢ cients on the interaction of the number of
dismissals of above median quality with year dummies as in column (2) and so on. The excluded year is 1931. The regression
also includes the interaction of percentage destruction with year dummies and all control variables. To improve clarity, 95 percent
condence intervals are omitted from the graph. All regression coe¢ cients are signicantly di¤erent from 0 (Table 10).
The fall in hiring quality was partly driven by a decline in the quality of PhD students that
were produced in departments with dismissals after 1933 (Waldinger, 2010). The decline in
faculty quality was perpetuated because German universities often hire former PhD students.37
36The quality of hires is measured by career citation weighted publications which I normalize to have a zero
mean and a standard deviation of one within subjects.
37Almost 20 percent of mathematics PhD students who graduated between 1912 and 1940 and who obtained a
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Another potential mechanism for the persistence of the human shock could be localized pro-
ductivity spillovers. The productivity of scientists who remained in departments with dismissals
after 1933 could have declined because of a reduction in the number and quality of local peers.
The potential productivity decline for scientists who were present in 1933 could have a¤ected
later generations of scientists in departments with dismissals. In this case, however, localized
spillovers are unlikely to drive persistence because even the productivity of scientists who di-
rectly experienced the dismissals did not decline. Not even the loss of high quality colleagues
had negative productivity e¤ects on contemporaneous local peers (Waldinger, 2012).
6 Conclusion
I use the dismissal of scientists in Nazi Germany and Allied bombings during WWII as exoge-
nous and temporary shocks to the human and physical capital of science departments. While
I nd evidence that both shocks had negative productivity e¤ects in the short run, depart-
ments that su¤ered from physical destruction recovered by 1961. By 1970, departments with
buildings that were destroyed during WWII even did slightly better than departments with-
out bombing destruction. The human capital shock, however, had a larger negative e¤ect on
productivity in the short run and was much more persistent. I also show that the dismissal of
high quality scientists caused particularly large productivity reductions. The ndings indicate
that human capital is potentially more important than physical capital for the productivity of
science departments.
My ndings, of course, do not indicate that physical capital is irrelevant for productivity
because post-war reconstruction targeted destroyed departments. It seems, however, that neg-
ative shocks to physical capital can be overcome much more easily than human capital shocks.
In recent years, some elds of science have become more dependent on large capital expendi-
tures such as particle accelerators. Negative physical shocks in these elds may lead to more
persistent e¤ects on productivity than shocks that have occurred in the past.
The persistence of the human capital shock is particularly remarkable if one considers that
most scientists who had been employed by the former German universities (Breslau now Wro-
claw, TU Breslau, and Königsberg now Kaliningrad) that became part of Poland and the Soviet
Union had to relocate to universities that remained on German territory after 1945. Depart-
ments that had lost people during the dismissals could have hired the best people from these
universities.
I show that an important mechanism for the persistence of the human capital shock was
a permanent fall in the quality of new hires, in particular after the dismissal of high quality
scientists. Star scientists seem to be especially valuable as they attract other high quality
researchers. This suggests that appointing very high quality scholars may be a good strategy if
university position in Germany returned to the university that had granted their PhD. The Pearson chi-squared
test statistic to test the hypothesis of independence of the PhD university and the university of employment is
1,300. The hypothesis is thus rejected with a p-value smaller than 0.001.
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a university of country wanted to raise its research prole. In fact, anecdotal evidence suggests
that hiring high-quality faculty during the 1980s and 1990s has been instrumental for the recent
rise of New York University and in particular their economics department (Honan, 1995).
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Table 7: Individual Subjects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Citation Citation Citation
Publi- weighted Publi- weighted Publi- weighted
Dependent Variable: cations Pubs. cations Pubs. cations Pubs.
Physics Chemistry Mathematics
Number of Dismissals * 1926 0.164 -0.033 0.026 0.012 -0.180 -0.469**
(0.140) (0.286) (0.016) (0.038) (0.181) (0.187)
Number of Dismissals * 1940 -0.112** -0.181 -0.178*** -0.053** -0.295* -0.553***
(0.044) (0.227) (0.060) (0.020) (0.162) (0.192)
Number of Dismissals * 1950 -0.059 -0.122 -0.317*** -0.101* -0.445** -0.606***
(0.190) (0.248) (0.110) (0.054) (0.182) (0.182)
Number of Dismissals * 1961 -0.215** -0.277 -0.309*** -0.060 -0.440** -0.472**
(0.089) (0.189) (0.089) (0.084) (0.178) (0.202)
Number of Dismissals * 1970 -0.271*** -0.314 -0.346*** -0.101 -0.454** -0.500**
(0.080) (0.204) (0.096) (0.061) (0.177) (0.200)
Number of Dismissals * 1980 -0.291** -0.436** -0.247*** 0.078 -0.404** -0.475**
(0.119) (0.186) (0.089) (0.082) (0.165) (0.175)
% Destruction * 1926 -0.002 -0.001 0.005 0.003 -0.007 -0.007
(0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006)
% Destruction * 1931 -0.002 -0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.013** -0.005
(0.003) (0.002) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006) (0.009)
% Destruction * 1950 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.002 -0.007 -0.004
(0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
% Destruction * 1961 0.001 -0.002 0.003 0.005 -0.007 -0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006)
% Destruction * 1970 0.003 0.001 0.008 0.018 0.008 0.006
(0.004) (0.003) (0.007) (0.012) (0.005) (0.007)
% Destruction * 1980 -0.002 0.002 0.017* 0.023** -0.003 0.002
(0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.007) (0.008)
Department FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Subject*Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Occupation Zones * Post45 yes yes yes yes yes yes
% City Destruction * Year Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
All additional controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 238 238 238 238 238 238
R-squared 0.761 0.645 0.868 0.761 0.750 0.666
***signicant at 1% **signicant at 5% *signicant at 10% (s.e. clustered at university level)
The dependent variable Publications reported in odd columns is the sum of publications published by all scientists in department
d in a ve-year window around year t. The dependent variable Citation weighted Pubs. reported in even columns is the sum of
publications published by all scientists in department d in a ve-year window around year t. Dependent variables are normalized
to have zero mean and a standard deviation of one within subjects. Number of Dismissals * 1926 is equal to the number of
dismissals in Nazi Germany between 1933 and 1940 interacted with an indicator that is equal to 1 for observations from 1926. The
other interactions are dened accordingly. The excluded interaction is the number of dismissals with 1931, the last observation
before the dismissals. % Destruction * 1926 is equal to percentage destruction caused by Allied bombings between 1940 and 1945
interacted with an indicator that is equal to 1 for observations from 1926. The other interactions are dened accordingly. The
excluded interaction is % destruction with 1940, the last observation before the bombings. Department FE is the full set of 105
department xed e¤ects. Subject*Year FE is the interaction of subject indicators (for physics, chemistry, and mathematics) with
year dummies. Occupation Zones * Post45 is the interaction of occupation zone indicators (English zone, French zone, Soviet
zone, excluded category U.S. zone) with a post-1945 dummy. % City Destruction * Year Dummies is the interaction of city level
destruction with the full set of year dummies. All additional controls is the full set of additional control variables as used in column
(6) of Tables 5 and 6.
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Table 9: Persistence of Dismissal and Bombing Shocks - Department Size
(1) (2) (3)
Department Department Department
Dependent Variable: Size Size Size
Number of Dismissals * 1926 -0.217*** -0.218***
(0.060) (0.056)
Number of Dismissals * 1940 -0.612*** -0.604***
(0.078) (0.083)
Number of Dismissals * 1950 -1.129*** -1.124***
(0.353) (0.336)
Number of Dismissals * 1961 -1.045*** -1.064***
(0.267) (0.257)
Number of Dismissals * 1970 -0.935** -1.009**
(0.381) (0.374)
Number of Dismissals * 1980 0.063 0.024
(0.665) (0.656)
% Destruction * 1926 0.005 0.006
(0.013) (0.013)
% Destruction * 1931 0.005 0.004
(0.011) (0.010)
% Destruction * 1950 -0.034 -0.029
(0.025) (0.024)
% Destruction * 1961 -0.008 -0.003
(0.029) (0.029)
% Destruction * 1970 0.050* 0.056**
(0.025) (0.027)
% Destruction * 1980 0.034 0.041
(0.055) (0.056)
Department FE yes yes yes
Subject*Year FE yes yes yes
Occupation Zones * Post45 yes yes yes
% City Destruction * Year Dummies yes yes yes
All additional controls yes yes yes
Observations 714 714 714
R-squared 0.882 0.878 0.884
***signicant at 1% level **signicant at 5% level *signicant at 10% level
(All standard errors clustered at university level)
The dependent variable Department Size measures department size in department d and year t. Number of Dismissals * 1926 is
equal to the number of dismissals between 1933 and 1940 interacted with an indicator that is equal to 1 for observations from 1926.
The other interactions are dened accordingly. The excluded interaction is the number of dismissals with 1931, the last observation
before the dismissals. % Destruction * 1926 is equal to percentage destruction caused by Allied bombings between 1940 and 1945
interacted with an indicator that is equal to 1 for observations from 1926. The other interactions are dened accordingly. The
excluded interaction is % destruction with 1940, the last observation before the bombings. Department FE is the full set of 105
department xed e¤ects. Subject*Year FE is the interaction of subject indicators (for physics, chemistry, and mathematics) with
year dummies. Occupation Zones * Post45 is the interaction of occupation zone indicators (English zone, French zone, Soviet
zone, excluded category U.S. zone) with a post-1945 dummy. % City Destruction * Year Dummies is the interaction of city level
destruction with the full set of year dummies. All additional controls is the full set of additional control variables as used in column
(6) of Tables 5 and 6.
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Table 10: Quality of New Hires
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Quality Quality Quality Quality Quality
Dependent Variable: of Hires of Hires of Hires of Hires of Hires
All Above Top 25th Top 10th Top
Dismissal Quality: Dismissals median Quality percentile percentile 5th percentile
Number of Dismissals * 1940 -0.059*** -0.096*** -0.145*** -0.249*** -0.428***
(0.014) (0.018) (0.040) (0.051) (0.133)
Number of Dismissals * 1950 -0.055** -0.090*** -0.138*** -0.234*** -0.400***
(0.020) (0.027) (0.046) (0.061) (0.139)
Number of Dismissals * 1961 -0.054*** -0.089*** -0.134*** -0.226*** -0.417***
(0.013) (0.018) (0.037) (0.049) (0.120)
Number of Dismissals * 1970 -0.055*** -0.090*** -0.141*** -0.266*** -0.484***
(0.020) (0.028) (0.041) (0.054) (0.130)
Number of Dismissals * 1980 -0.064*** -0.112*** -0.171*** -0.285*** -0.520***
(0.017) (0.031) (0.054) (0.069) (0.160)
% Destruction * Year Dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Department FE yes yes yes yes yes
Subject*Year FE yes yes yes yes yes
Occupation Zone * Post45 yes yes yes yes yes
% City Destruction * Year Dummies yes yes yes yes yes
All additional controls yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 602 602 602 602 602
R-squared 0.401 0.406 0.421 0.436 0.453
***signicant at 1% **signicant at 5% *signicant at 10% (s.e. clustered at university level)
The dependent variable Quality of Hires measures the average quality of new hires in department d between year t and year t-1.
Quality of hires is measured by the career average of citation-weighted publications. The variable is normalized to have zero mean
and a standard deviation of one within subjects. Number of Dismissals * 1926 is equal to the number of dismissals between 1933
and 1940 interacted with an indicator that is equal to 1 for observations from 1926. The other interactions are dened accordingly.
The excluded interaction is the number of dismissals with 1931, the last observation before the dismissals. % Destruction * Year
Dummies is equal to percentage destruction caused by Allied bombings between 1940 and 1945 interacted with a full set of year
dummies as in the main specication. Department FE is the full set of 105 department xed e¤ects. Subject*Year FE is the
interaction of subject indicators (for physics, chemistry, and mathematics) with year dummies. Occupation Zones * Post45 is the
interaction of occupation zone indicators (English zone, French zone, Soviet zone, excluded category U.S. zone) with a post-1945
dummy. % City Destruction * Year Dummies is the interaction of city level destruction with the full set of year dummies. All
additional controls is the full set of additional control variables as used in column (6) of Tables 5 and 6.
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8.1 Appendix Figures
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Figure A1: Nobel Prizes in physics and chemistry
Note: The gure reports the percentage of Nobel Prizes awarded in physics and chemistry to scientists a¢ liated with a university
in the respective country for each decade from 1901 to 1980. Prizes are weighted according to the fractions awarded by the Nobel
committee (i.e. if the prize was awarded to 3 scientists in one year with one scientist getting 0.5 of the prize, and the other two
scientists receiving 0.25 of the prize their countries would be assigned 0.5 and 0.25 respectively). Over the time period 1901 to 1980
scientists based in Austrian universities contribute 2 prizes to the combined total of 33.75 prizes awarded to scientists in German
and Austrian universities. Data on Nobel Prizes and university a¢ liations come from http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/.
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8.2 Appendix Tables
Table A1: Top Journals
Historical Current
Journal Name Published in Top Journal Top Journal
General Journals
Nature UK yes yes
Naturwissenschaften Germany yes
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA yes
Proceedings of the Royal Society of London A (Mathematics and Physics) UK yes
Science USA yes yes
Sitzungsberichte der Pressischen Akademie der Wissenschaften Germany yes
Physics
Annalen der Physik Germany yes
Applied Physics Letters USA yes
Astrophysical Journal UK yes
Journal of Applied Physics USA yes
Journal of Chemical Physics USA yes
Journal of Geophysical Research B: Solid Earth USA yes
Physical Review USA yes yes
Physical Review A USA yes
Physical Review B USA yes
Physical Review C USA yes
Physical Review D USA yes
Physical Review Letters USA yes
Physikalische Zeitschrift Germany yes
Zeitschrift für Physik Germany yes
Chemistry
Analytical Chemistry USA yes
Angewandte Chemie - International Edition in English UK yes
Berichte der Deutschen Chemischen Gesellschaft Germany yes
Biochemische Zeitschrift Germany yes
Chemical Communications USA yes
Inorganic Chemistry USA yes
Journal für Praktische Chemie Germany yes
Journal of Biological Chemistry USA yes
Journal of Organic Chemistry USA yes
Journal of Physical Chemistry USA yes yes
Journal of the American Chemical Society USA yes
Journal of the Chemical Society UK yes
Justus Liebigs Annalen Chemie Germany yes
Kolloid Zeitschrift Germany
Tetrahedron Letters Netherlands yes
Zeitschrift für Anorganische Chemie und Allgemeine Chemie Germany yes
Zeitschrift für Elektrochemie und Angewandte Physikalische Chemie Germany yes
Zeitschrift für Physikalische Chemie Germany yes
Mathematics
Acta Mathematica Sweden yes yes
Advances in Mathematics USA yes
Annals of Mathematics USA yes yes
Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society USA yes
Inventiones Mathematicae yes
Jounal für die reine und angewandte Mathematik Germany yes
Journal of Functional Analysis USA yes
Journal of the London Mathematical Society Germany
Mathematische Annalen Germany yes
Mathematische Zeitschrift Germany yes
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A UK yes
Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society UK yes
Zeitschrift für angewandte Mathematik und Mechanik Germany yes
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Table A2: Top Scientists
Yearly Career Dis- First Last
Cit. weighted Nobel missed year year
Name University 1 University 2 Publications Prize 1933-40 in data in data
Physics
Wigner, Eugen Berlin TU 619.8 yes 1933 1931 1931
Binder, Kurt Köln 468.3 1980 1980
Cardona, Manuel Stuttgart TU 284.3 1980 1980
Ewald, Peter Paul Stuttgart TU 161.8 1937 1926 1931
Wegner, Franz Heidelberg 148.3 1980 1980
Born, Max Göttingen 144.2 yes 1933 1926 1931
Greiner, Walter Frankfurt 135.6 1970 1980
Schrödinger, Erwin Berlin 129.6 yes 1933 1926 1931
Schmidt, Michael Heidelberg 112.5 1980 1980
Bergmann, Gerd Köln 97.3 1980 1980
Haken, Hermann Stuttgart TU 96.5 1961 1980
Hess, Karl Wien 91.5 1980 1980
Schmid, Albert Karlsruhe TU 88.2 1970 1980
Hohenberg, Pierre München TU 87.9 1980 1980
Einstein, Albert Berlin 82.2 yes 1933 1926 1931
Schatz, Gerd Heidelberg 73.5 1980 1980
Müller, Bernd Frankfurt 70.1 1980 1980
Fulde, Peter Frankfurt Darmstadt TU 68.4 1970 1980
Schlögl, Friedrich Aachen TU 67.2 1961 1980
Gross, Ferdinand Graz 66.2 1970 1980
Chemistry
Meyerhof, Otto Heidelberg 277.4 yes 1938 1931 1931
Sies, Helmut München 172.6 1980 1980
Neuberg, Carl Berlin 163.5 1938 1926 1931
Lynen, Feodor München 160.2 yes 1961 1970
Eckstein, Fritz Göttingen 159.2 1980 1980
Giese, Bernd Darmstadt TU 153.0 1980 1980
Reetz Manfred T. Marburg 151.0 1980 1980
Pette, Dirk München 141.1 1970 1970
Lohmann, Karl Heidelberg Berlin 136.1 1931 1961
Neupert, Walter München 135.8 1980 1980
Bergmann, Max Dresden TU 129.6 1933 1926 1931
Vorbrüggen, Helmut Berlin TU 125.2 1980 1980
von Raque Schleyer Erlangen 110.8 1980 1980
Paulsen, Hans Hamburg 110.0 1970 1980
Witkop, Bernhard München 108.9 1950 1950
Hoppe, Rudolf Gießen 106.3 1961 1980
Vögtlke, Fritz Würzburg 104.7 1980 1980
Kessler, Horst Frankfurt 103.8 1980 1980
Wieghardt, Karl Hannover TU 95.0 1980 1980
Westphal, Otto Freiburg 94.2 1961 1980
Mathematics
von Neumann, Johann Berlin 150.6 1933 1931 1931
Keller, Wilfried Hamburg 75.6 1980 1980
Bott, Raoul Bonn 51.8 1961 1970
Kaup, Wilhelm Tübingen 43.2 1980 1980
Lorentz, George G. Tübingen 39.7 1950 1950
von Mises, Richard Berlin TU 38.2 1933 1926 1931
Friedrichs, Kurt Göttingen 37.4 1937 1931 1931
Jensen, Ronald Bonn 35.6 1980 1980
Krieger, Wolfgang Heidelberg 35.3 1980 1980
Barth, Wolf Erlangen 29.1 1980 1980
Szegö, Gabriel Berlin 27.6 1933 1926 1931
Löh, Hans-Günter Hamburg 26.2 1980 1980
Weyl, Hermann Göttingen 26.0 1933 1926 1931
Schae¤er, Helmut Hamburg 24.1 1980 1980
Lewy, Hans Göttingen 23.4 1933 1931 1931
Dold, Albrecht Heidelberg 22.3 1961 1980
Grauert, Hans Göttingen 18.7 1961 1980
Becker, Jochen Berlin TU 18.3 1980 1980
Hausdor¤, Felix Bonn 16.7 1926 1931
Menger, Karl Wien 16.7 1938 1931 1931
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Table A3: First Stages - Instrumenting with University Destruction for Subject
Destruction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
% Subj. % Subj. % Subj. % Subj. % Subj. % Subj.
Destruction Destruction Destruction Destruction Destruction Destruction
Dependent Variable: * 1926 * 1931 * 1950 * 1961 * 1970 * 1980
% Uni. Destruction * 1926 0.602*** -0.011 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.005
(0.166) (0.014) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.011)
% Uni. Destruction * 1931 -0.011 0.602*** 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004
(0.013) (0.167) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008)
% Uni. Destruction * 1950 -0.001 0.001 0.608*** -0.002 0.001 0.015
(0.026) (0.026) (0.148) (0.024) (0.023) (0.017)
% Uni. Destruction * 1961 -0.000 0.001 -0.005 0.611*** 0.001 0.014
(0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.148) (0.023) (0.020)
% Uni. Destruction * 1970 0.001 0.004 -0.013 -0.008 0.611*** 0.026
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.025) (0.148) (0.031)
% Uni. Destruction * 1980 0.002 0.005 -0.041 -0.034 -0.021 0.715***
(0.040) (0.039) (0.060) (0.061) (0.070) (0.250)
Number of Dismissals * Year Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Department FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Subject*Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Occupation Zones * Post45 yes yes yes yes yes yes
% City Destruction * Year Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
All additional controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 714 714 714 714 714 714
R-squared 0.814 0.813 0.810 0.810 0.811 0.865
Cragg-Donald EV Statistic 19.6
***signicant at 1% **signicant at 5% *signicant at 10% (s.e. clustered at university level)
The dependent variable % Dep. Destruction * 1926 reported in column (1) is equal to percentage destruction at the department
level caused by Allied bombings between 1940 and 1945 interacted with an indicator that is equal to 1 for observations from 1926.
Dependent variables in columns (2) to (6) are dened accordingly. The instrumental variable % Uni. Destruction * 1926 is equal
to percentage destruction at the university level caused by Allied bombings between 1940 and 1945 interacted with an indicator
that is equal to 1 for observations from 1926. The other instrumental variables are dened accordingly. The control variables
Number of Dismissals * Year Dummies are equal to the number of dismissals in Nazi Germany between 1933 and 1940 interacted
with a full set of year dummies. Department FE is the full set of 105 department xed e¤ects. Subject*Year FE is the interaction
of subject indicators (for physics, chemistry, and mathematics) with year dummies. Occupation Zones * Post45 is the interaction
of occupation zone indicators (English zone, French zone, Soviet zone, excluded category U.S. zone) with a post-1945 dummy. %
City Destruction * Year Dummies is the interaction of city level destruction with the full set of year dummies. All additional
controls is the full set of additional control variables as used in column (6) of Tables 5 and 6.
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Table A4: Interaction of Human and Physical Capital
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Citation Citation
weighted weighted
Dependent Variable: Publications Publications Publications Publications
Number of Dismissals * 1926 0.026 0.026 -0.087 -0.087
(0.026) (0.026) (0.077) (0.077)
Number of Dismissals * 1940 -0.175*** -0.174*** -0.181*** -0.181***
(0.038) (0.039) (0.064) (0.064)
Number of Dismissals * 1950 -0.246** -0.159 -0.187*** -0.162***
(0.099) (0.096) (0.028) (0.035)
Number of Dismissals * 1961 -0.286*** -0.271*** -0.191*** -0.174***
(0.071) (0.091) (0.039) (0.041)
Number of Dismissals * 1970 -0.323*** -0.316*** -0.215*** -0.244***
(0.069) (0.084) (0.050) (0.080)
Number of Dismissals * 1980 -0.272*** -0.284*** -0.181*** -0.222**
(0.061) (0.072) (0.064) (0.106)
% Destruction * 1926 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
% Destruction * 1931 -0.005* -0.005* -0.003 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
% Destruction * 1950 -0.005** -0.002 -0.004* -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
% Destruction * 1961 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
% Destruction * 1970 0.003 0.004 0.007 0.006
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
% Destruction * 1980 0.001 0.000 0.009 0.007
(0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006)
Number of Dismissals * % Destruction * 1950 -0.003** -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Number of Dismissals * % Destruction * 1961 -0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Number of Dismissals * % Destruction * 1970 -0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.002)
Number of Dismissals * % Destruction * 1980 0.001 0.002
(0.002) (0.003)
Department FE yes yes yes yes
Subject*Year FE yes yes yes yes
Occupation Zones * Post45 yes yes yes yes
% City Destruction * Year Dummies yes yes yes yes
All additional controls yes yes yes yes
Observations 714 714 714 714
R-squared 0.718 0.723 0.552 0.555
***signicant at 1% **signicant at 5% *signicant at 10% (s.e. clustered at university level)
The dependent variable Publications is the sum of publications published by all scientists in department d in a ve-year window
around year t. The dependent variable Citation weighted Pubs. is the sum of publications published by all scientists in department
d in a ve-year window around year t. Dependent variables are normalized to have zero mean and a standard deviation of one
within subjects. Number of Dismissals * 1926 is equal to the number of dismissals between 1933 and 1940 interacted with an
indicator that is equal to 1 for observations from 1926. The other interactions are dened accordingly. The excluded interaction
is the number of dismissals with 1931, the last observation before the dismissals. % Destruction * 1926 is equal to percentage
destruction caused by Allied bombings between 1940 and 1945 interacted with an indicator that is equal to 1 for observations from
1926. The other interactions are dened accordingly. The excluded interaction is % destruction with 1940, the last observation
before the bombings. Number of Dismissals * % Destruction * 1950 is the triple interaction of the number of dismissals, percentage
destruction, and an indicator for 1950. The other triple interactions are dened accordingly. Department FE is the full set of 105
department xed e¤ects. Subject*Year FE is the interaction of subject indicators (for physics, chemistry, and mathematics) with
year dummies. Occupation Zones * Post45 is the interaction of occupation zone indicators (English zone, French zone, Soviet
zone, excluded category U.S. zone) with a post-1945 dummy. % City Destruction * Year Dummies is the interaction of city level
destruction with the full set of year dummies. All additional controls is the full set of additional control variables as used in column
(6) of Tables 5 and 6.
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8.3 Calculation of Contribution of Human and Physical Capital
Shocks for the Decline of German Science
Dismissal Shock
The e¤ect of the dismissals on German science is calculated using the regression results includ-
ing all controls as in column (6) of Tables 5 and 6. Using the number of dismissals in each
department I calculate the reduction in (citation weighted) publications in each department for
1940, 1950, 1961, 1970, and 1980 in terms of standard deviations. For each department and
year I therefore calculate:
y1940 = bdismissals1940  (# of Dismissals 33-40),..., y1980 = bdismissals1980  (# of Dismissals 33-40)
Multiplying the ys with the subject level standard deviations of (citation weighted) publi-
cations I calculate the fall in productivity in each department in terms of (citation weighted)
publications (call them Yyear). The Yyears compute the reduction in (citation weighted)
publications for the years 1940, 1950, 1961, 1970, and 1980. To obtain the total reduction in
(citations weighted) publications for all years since 1933, I assume that the productivity loss be-
tween April 1933 and December 1945 was Y1940 in each year. Similarly, between January 1946
and December 1955 the annual loss in productivity was Y1950, and so on. Total productivity
loss between 1933 and 1980 was therefore:
Y1933 1980 = 12:75 Y1940 + 10 Y1950 + 10 Y1961 + 10 Y1970 + 5 Y1990
Adding Y1933 1980s for all departments in a subject, I obtain the total loss in (citation
weighted) publications in each subject from 1933 to 1980 (Y all1933 1980).
To calculate percentage losses I obtain the total number of (citation weighted) publications
that were published in a subject in 1940, 1950, 1961, 1970, and 1980:
Y tot1940; Y
tot
1950;..., Y
tot
1980
Average yearly (citation weighted) publications are obtained as follows:
Y totyearly =
1
5
( Y tot1940+ Y
tot
1950 + Y
tot
1961 + Y
tot
1970 + Y
tot
1980)
Total publications between April 1933 and December 1980 are calculated as:
Y tot1933 1980 = 47:75  Y totyearly
Finally, percentage loss between 1933 and 1980 is calculated as:38
%Y all1933 1980 =
Y all1933 1980
(Y tot1933 1980 Y all1933 1980)
 100
The top panel of Table A5 summarizes the total loss of (citation weighted) publications between
1933 and 1980 that was caused by the dismissal of scientists in Nazi Germany.
Bombing Shock
I calculate the e¤ect of Allied bombings on German science in a similar way. The calculations
also rely on the regression results including all controls as in column (6) of Tables 5 and
38Note: Y all1933 1980 <0.
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6. Using percentage destruction in each department I calculate the reduction in (citation
weighted) publications in each department for 1950, 1961, 1970, and 1980 in terms of standard
deviations. For each department and year I therefore calculate:39
y1950 = bbombings1950  (% Destruction 42-45),..., y1980 = bbombings1980  (% Destruction 42-45)
Multiplying the ys with the subject level standard deviations of (citation weighted) publi-
cations I calculate the fall in productivity in each department in terms of (citation weighted)
publications (call them Yyear). The Yyears compute the reduction in (citation weighted)
publications for the years 1950, 1961, 1970, and 1980. To obtain the total reduction in (cita-
tions weighted) publications for all years since 1944, I assume that the productivity loss between
January 1944 and December 1955 was Y1950 in each year. Similarly, between January 1956
and December 1965 the annual loss in productivity was Y1961, and so on. Total productivity
loss between 1944 and 1980 is therefore:
Y1944 1980 = 11 Y1950 + 10 Y1961 + 10 Y1970 + 5 Y1990
Adding the Y1944 1980s for all departments in a subject, I obtain the total loss in (citation
weighted) publications that was caused by Allied bombings in each subject from 1944 to 1980
(Y all1944 1980).
To calculate percentage losses I obtain the total number of (citation weighted) publications
that were published in a subject in 1950, 1961, 1970, and 1980:
Y tot1950; Y
tot
1961;..., Y
tot
1980
Average yearly (citation weighted) publications are obtained as follows:
Y totyearly =
1
4
(Y tot1950 + Y
tot
1961 + Y
tot
1970 + Y
tot
1980)
Total publications between January 1944 and December 1980 are calculated as:
Y tot1944 1980 = 36  Y totyearly
Finally, percentage loss between 1944 and 1980 is calculated as:40
%Y all1944 1980 =
Y all1944 1980
(Y tot1944 1980 Y all1944 1980)
 100
The bottom panel of Table A5 summarizes the total loss of (citation weighted) publications
between 1944 and 1980 that was caused by Allied bombings.
39I only consider bbombingsx if the coe¢ cient is at least signicant at the 10 percent level for year X. For all
other years I set y = 0: As a result, y1961,y1970;y1980 are set to 0. See column (6) of Tables 5 and 6.
40Note: Y all1933 1980 <0.
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Table A5: Total Productivity Loss of Dismissals and Bombings
Physics Chemistry Mathematics Total
Dismissal Loss
Number of publications lost 1933-1980 2029 6848 699 9576
Number of citation weighted publication lost 1933-1980 60703 122248 8969 191920
Percentage of publications lost 1933-1980 30.5 36.5 33.5 33.5
Percentage of citation weighted publications lost 1933-1980 34.0 33.2 36.6 34.6
Publications by dismissed scientists 362 594 225 1181
Citation weighted publications by dismissed 14826 12708 4835 32369
Bombing Loss
Number of publications lost 1944-1980 231 710 87 1028
Number of citation weighted publication lost 1944-1980 7410 13589 1195 22194
Percentage of publications lost 1944-1980 5.0 5.9 6.2 5.7
Percentage of citation weighted publications lost 1944-1980 6.2 5.5 7.6 6.4
8.4 Data Appendix
8.4.1 Panel Data Set of Scientists in German and Austrian Universities from 1926
to 1980
As described in the main text I use Kürschners Deutscher Gelehrtenkalender (KDG) to
construct a panel data set of German scientists at 7 points in time between 1926 and 1980.
The KDG covers all researchers in German speaking universities. To compile the KDG the
editors contacted all German speaking universities to obtain faculty rosters and then sent out
questionnaires to all faculty members. The response rate to these questionnaires was very high.
If a scholar did not answer the questionnaire the editors of the KDG tried to nd as much
information as possible on the scholar.
There sometimes was a slight delay until a young researcher was included in the KDG or
until a university change was recorded. A privatdozent, for example, may have been appointed
in 1926 but may not appear in the 1926 volume because she was not a privatdozent at the
time the questionnaires were sent out. The same scientist, however, would appear in the 1931
volume with her complete appointment history. If that history indicates that she had already
been a privatdozent in 1926 I also include her in the 1926 roster. This gives a more accurate
picture of each departments faculty in the relevant year.
The KDGs list researchers who occupied di¤erent university positions. I focus on all re-
searchers who had the right to teach (venia legendi) at a German university, i.e. all researchers
who were at least privatdozent. The data therefore include ordinary professors, extraordinary
professors, honorary professors, and privatdozenten. The Nazi government renamed the pri-
vatdozentposition into dozentwhich a¤ects the data in 1941. To have a comparable set of
researchers across di¤erent years I also add all dozenten to the data.
49
8.4.2 Productivity Measures for German and Austrian Science Departments
The publications and citations data cover historical and current top science journals and were
downloaded from the ISI Web of Science. The set of journals is based on historical accounts of
relevant top journals and on current journal rankings.
Historical top journals
The list of top journals in the 1920s and 1930s includes mostly German journals but also the
major international journals. As German science was leading at the time, many of the German
journals were among the best journals worldwide which is underlined by an article published in
Science in 1941: Before the advent of the Nazis the German physics journals (Zeitschrift für
Physik, Annalen der Physik, Physikalische Zeitschrift) had always served as the central organs
of world science in this domain [...] In 1930 approximately 700 scientic papers were printed
in its [the Zeitschrift für Physik´s] seven volumes of which 280 were by foreign scientists
(American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1941).
I obtain the list of historical journals in three step process. First, I obtain all German science
journals published in the 1920s to 1940s that are included in the Web of Science. Second, I in-
clude three general science journals that were relevant outlets for German scientists publishing
in the 1920s and 1930s: Nature, Science, and the Proceedings of the Royal Society. Finally, the
list of historical top journals is augmented by four international eld journals that have been
recommended by historians of science as important outlets for German scientists. Relevant
chemistry journals were suggested by Ute Deichmann and John Andraos who work on chem-
istry in the early 20th century. Historical mathematics journals were suggested by Reinhard
Siegmund-Schultze and David Wilkins who are specialists in the history of mathematics.
Current top journals
The denition of top journals for German (and international) scientists changed substantially
since the 1920s and 30s. To reect this change in my productivity measure I also compile
a second list of top journals based on current international journal rankings. I use rankings
provided by SCImago Journal & Country Rank to obtain the ten most cited journals in general
science, physics, and chemistry. SCImago does not rank mathematics journals.41 I therefore
obtain the current most cited mathematics journals from a commonly used ranking provided
by the University of Texas.42
Universe of Articles in Top Science Journals Published Between 1920 and 1985
The overall list of top science journals includes 51 journals. I download all articles published in
these journals between 1920 and 1985. I.e. even if a journal only became a top journal in later
years I download all articles published in the journal since 1920. A small number of journals
were only founded after 1920. For these journals I download all articles since the creation of
the journal. The publication of a few journals was interrupted towards the end of WWII. As
41See http://www.scimagojr.com, accessed 13th of May 2010.
42See http://www.ma.utexas.edu/users/lsilvest/rankings/mranking.html, accessed 13th of May, 2010.
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a result these journals have missing data during those years. Furthermore, some journals have
missing data in the Web of Science for some years even though the journal was published in
that year.43 The inclusion of year xed e¤ects in all regressions addresses this problem.
8.4.3 Data on Bombings of German Universities and Science Departments
Data on university level bombing destruction come from university websites and from Tietze
(1995), Phillips (1983), Samuel and Thomas (1949), Schneider (1990), and Cheval (1991).
As outlined in the main text, data on department level bombing destruction is obtained by
contacting university archivists and asking them to provide destruction information for build-
ings used by physicists, chemists, and mathematicians.44 Detailed data sources for department
level destruction are listed in Table A6.
If a department occupied more than one building (e.g. one building for the institute of ex-
perimental physics and a di¤erent building accommodating the institute for theoretical physics)
I average percentage destruction across all buildings.
In some cases the historical sources only provide verbal descriptions of bombing destruction.
I convert these descriptions into percentage destruction according to the following rule:
Verbal description Percentage destruction
completely destroyed 100%
heaviest destructionor "destroyed to a large extent" 75%
heavy destruction 50%
part destructionor "burnt out" 25%
light destruction 10%
8.4.4 Data Sources of Control Variables
I obtain data on control variables from a number of sources.
Number of Departments Within 50km
For each university I calculate the number of departments in the same subject within 50km.
The measure also includes universities that were founded after 1945. The full list of universities
in Germany as of 2010 was obtained from Personal and Hochschulen - Fachserie 11, Reihe 4.4,
2010accessed online at http://www.destatis.de/jetspeed/portal/cms/Sites/destatis/Internet/
43I have highlighted this problem to Thomson Scientic. It is caused by error prone scanning of historical
journals.
44The following university archivists put in a lot of time and e¤ort to gather information on department
level bombing destruction or to provide access to the relevant sources: Klaus Graf (Aachen TU), Claudia
Schülzky (Berlin TU), (Berlin), Thomas Becker (Bonn), Klaus Oberdieck (Braunschweig TU), Matthias Lienert
(Dresden TU), Michael Maaser (Frankfurt), Dieter Speck (Freiburg), Eva-Maria Felschow (Gießen), Ulrich
Hunger (Göttingen), Alois Kernbauer (Graz), Marieluise Vesulak (Graz TU), Ralf-Torsten Speler (Halle), Eckart
Krause (Hamburg), Lars Nebelung (Hannover TU), Peter Goller (Innsbruck), Joachim Bauer (Jena), Klaus
Nippert (Karlsruhe TU), Dagmar Bickelmann (Kiel), Andreas Freitäger (Köln), Jens Blecher and Roy Lämmel
(Leipzig), Katharina Schaal (Marburg), Hans-Michael Körner (München), Margot Fuchs (München TU), Sabine
Happ (Münster), Norbert Becker (Stuttgart), Thomas Maisel (Wien), Juliane Mikoletzky (Wien TU), Marcus
Holtz (Würzburg).
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DE/Content/Publikationen/Fachveroe¤entlichungen/BildungForschungKultur/Hochschulen/P
ersonalHochschulen2110440107004,property=le.pdf, a publication of the German statistical
agency (Statistisches Bundesamt). A list of Austrian universities in 2011 was obtained from the
Austrian statistical agency (Statistik Austria) accessed online at: http://www.statistik.at/web_
de/statistiken/bildung_und_kultur/formales_bildungswesen/universitaeten_studium/index.
html. Using university websites I check for their founding year and whether they have a physics,
chemistry, or mathematics department. This allows me to calculate the number of departments
within 50km for each department and year in my sample.
Armament Related Industries in 1933
Data on the share of rms in three armament related industries (iron and steel production, me-
chanical engineering and vehicle construction, chemical industry) come from the establishment
census of 1933 that was published in Statistik des Deutschen Reichs Band 463: Gewerbliche
Betriebszählung, 1935. Data on industry shares in Austria come from the establishment cen-
sus of 1930 that was published by the Bundesamt für Statistik in Gewerbliche Betriebszählung
in der Republik Österreich, 1932. The data measure the share of rms that belong to a certain
industry (among all rms) at the city level.
Fraction of Jews in 1933
The fraction of Jews in 1933 is based on German census data from 1933. The data were
obtained from Statistik des Deutschen Reiches: Die Bevölkerung des Deutschen Reichs nach
den Ergebnissen der Volkszählung 1933, Band 451, Heft 3 (1936). As the German census of
1933 did not cover Austrian cities data on the Jewish population in the three Austrians cities in
my sample were obtained from a number of di¤erent sources. Data for Vienna are for the year
1934 and come from Statistisches Jahrbuch der Stadt Wien 1930-1935 Neue Folge, 3. Band.
Data for Graz are from 1938 and come from Israelitische Kultusgemeinde für Steiermark,
Kärnten und die politischen Bezirke des Burgenlandes Oberwart, Güssing und Jennersdorf
and were accessed online at http://www.ikg-graz.at/. Data on Innsbruck are from 1938 and
come from Salinger (2007).
Distance to the Iron Curtain
Distance to the Iron Curtain for German cities come from Redding and Sturm (2008). Distance
to the Iron Curtain for Austrian cities is measured equivalently using the original Redding and
Sturm method.45
45I thank Daniel Sturm for kindly o¤ering to use his material to measure distances to the iron curtain for
Austrian cities.
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Table A6: Detailed Data Sources for Department Level Destruction Data
University Source for Department Level Destruction
Aachen TU Kriegsschäden Akten 438, 1189, 1234a
Berlin Humboldt Universität Berlin, Universitätsarchiv, Bestand des Universitätskurators, Aktennr. 655
Berlin TU Universitätsarchiv der Technischen Universität Berlin in der Universitätsbibliothek, 602-44
Bonn van Rey (1995)
Braunschweig TU Kuhlenkamp (1976)
Darmstadt TU missing
Dresden TU Technische Universität Dresden (1996)
Erlangen no bombing destruction
Frankfurt Universitätsarchiv Frankfurt (1947), Abteilung 50, Nr. 3046 BII, 241-244
Freiburg Rösiger (1957)
Gießen Universitätsarchiv Gießen, PrA. Nr. 2208
Göttingen Brinkmann (1985)
Graz e-mail communication with university archivist Prof. Dr. Alois Kernbauer
Graz TU Weingand (1995), p. 58, p. 103
Greifswald no bombing destruction
Halle Eberle (2002)
Hamburg e-mail communication with university archivist Eckart Krause, Kröplin (1951), pp.422-428,
Senat Hamburg (1955), Giles (1985), p. 297
Hannover TU Wolters (1950)
Heidelberg no bombing destruction
Innsbruck Klebelsberg (1953), pp. 193-196
Jena Schmidt, Elm, Steiger, Böhlaus (1983), pp. 301-302
Karlsruhe TU Hoepke (2007)
Kiel Jaeger (1965), pp. 117-202
Köln Universitätsarchiv documents
Leipzig Füssler (1961)
Marburg Fritzsche, Hardt, and Schade (2003), p. 30
München Mager (1958), p. 255
München TU Technische Hochschule München (1968)
Münster Niemer (2010)
Rostock no bombing destruction
Stuttgart TU Technische Hochschule Stuttgart (1947)
Tübingen no bombing destruction
Wien Adamovich (1947)
Wien TU e-mail communication with university archivist Dr. Juliane Mikoletzky
Würzburg e-mail communication with university archivist Dr. Marcus Holtz
The table shows detailed data sources for department level destruction. Detailed citations can be found below.
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